Recommendation: Long

Warner Music Group (NASDAQ: WMG)

Investment Presentation

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Investment Thesis

Warner Music Group is best positioned to capitalize on powerful digitization trends that are revolutionizing the future of music.


Powerful Industry Trends	 Streaming is under-penetrated today at just ~11% of total smartphone users today, and we estimate streaming subs will >3x over the next decade. DSPs (e.g. Spotify) have more pricing power remaining and are likely to raise prices, which flows directly through to Warner's bottom line. Ad-based streaming is undermonetized with YouTube holding ~47% of digital music consumption but only ~6% of recorded music revenues. 	Digitization of music is a generational tailwind , and WMG holds the chokepoint of the industry. WMG's role
Chokepoint of Hourglass	 Shift to digital has ~20x'd the number of songs being released annually over the last two decades, significantly enhancing label leverage over artists. Increasing competition between a fragmented DSP competitor set retains Warner's leverage over streaming platforms and end-customers. Warner sits at the chokepoint of the hourglass with DSPs on one side and artists on the other, and we expect LT Adj. EBITDA margins to rise above ~20%. 	will strengthen in the music industry, not weaken, despite Wall Street's overblown fears of diminishing leverage over other ecosystem players.
Embedded Call Options	 New emerging music opportunities in social media platforms (e.g. TikTok), connected fitness, gaming, and SVOD create ~\$3B in revenue uplift by 2025. Integration of music into the metaverse could expand market size by >\$4B in revenue over the same time period. 	\$80 \$70 \$60 \$50 \$40
Attractive Setup	 We expect Warner to beat consensus EBITDA estimates over the next four years, and we are +14% vs. sell-side estimates. Street sentiment is low, with 7 of the 17 analysts on the Street at sell or hold. 	\$30 \$20 \$10 \$- Jun-20 Dec-20 Jun-21 Dec-21 Jun-22 Dec-22 Jun-23 Dec-23 Jun-24

Record labels like Warner Music Group monetize music intellectual property in a variety of ways.

				DESCRIPTION				COMPANY HISTORY
Recorded Music - Digital	subscription st Downloads &	nerated as cut of st reaming and ad-bas Other: Includes rev I music (e.g. using th	1967: Emerged as a result of consolidation of multiple media players.					
Recorded Music - Physical	 Shrinking percent 	cut of sales of phys centage of revenue (v with parts of this s	given adoption	of streaming), an		c remains a sma	Ill revenue portion	2005: Taken public by consortium of PE owners.
Music Publishing Digital	recording. ThisIncludes reven	ng is sales generate s could include cove ues generated fron that may use the m	ers of the originant of the origination of the origination of the origination of the original serves of the original serves of the origination of	al recording or o vices, download s	ther forms of alt services, digital p	erations to the o	original	2011: LBO'd by Access, who oversaw the transition towards digital revenue streams.
Music Publishing Non-Digital	_ that are not dig	sic publishing inclu gital, such as physic g pandemic but has	al performances	s or mechanical r	oyalties (from D	VDs/CDs)	various venues	2011-2020: Transitioned towards streaming and digital revenue streams faster than peers.
Revenu	e by Segment (TCMe)	■ Recorde	d Music ■ Music	C C	\$8,585	\$9,529	\$10,643	2020: IPO'd in mid-2020.
\$4,475	\$5,298	\$6,215	\$6,954	\$7,728				Ļ
2019	2020 2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Source: Internal Estimates, Company Filing

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Warner Music Group was one of the first to capitalize on digital streaming and has been early to new emerging music use cases.



Independents





- Independents have been capturing slight share over the last few years driven by digital-first record labels.
- Typically significantly smaller or localized to a given geography or genre.
- Generally provides more flexibility and rights to artists at the expense of fewer marketing resources and limited support.
- Some new innovative independent labels (e.g. Kobalt) have captured market share by offering more data analytics and "disruptive" offerings.

Source: Company Filings, Tegus, Internal Estimates

Generational Music Tailwinds


Warner Music Group benefits from powerful secular trends propelling the music industry.

	% Pene	tration	
Country	2021	2026e	
Largest:			
USA	27.0%	41.5%	Large develope
Japan	10.5%	15.8%	markets still
UK	27.5%	38.1%	underpenetrated re
Germany	25.1%	31.9%	to early adopter
France	12.3%	16.2%	5 1
South Korea	20.6%	28.0%	
China	12.2%	19.1%	
<u>Early:</u>			
Sweden	49.0%		
Norway	60.0%		


PENETRATION OF STREAMING REMAINS LOW...

... AND USERS (IN MM) WILL INCREASE DRAMATICALLY

... BUT THE OPPORTUNITY IS STILL LARGER (2021 MAUS)




MUSIC IS EXTREMELY UNDERMONETIZED... (2021 REVS)




... WHICH SUPPORTS PRICING INCREASES


Country	Normal	I	amily	
US	\$ 9.99) \$	14.99	
Mexico	5.14	1	7.74	Spotify Prices
Germany	11.06	6	16.60	
UK	12.87	7	19.31	
France	11.06	6	16.60	
Spain	11.06	6	16.60	
Sweden	10.30)	15.50	
Netherlands	11.06	5	16.60	
Japan	9.01	L	13.61	
Poland	5.17	7	7.75	




... AND BETTER MONETIZATION OF AD-BASED MUSIC



Warner Music Group is situated at the chokepoint in the industry, controlling the economics for both artists and DSPs.



Warner Music Group is more levered to emerging streaming platforms and digital opportunities than peers.



Imminent beats to earnings should support multiple and drive outperformance vs. market indices.

CAPITALIZA	TION			SU	MMARY FI	NANCIALS								RETURNS			
	Book					FYE	September	r 30,						V	aluation at Dat	e,	
	12/31/21		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027		9/30/22	9/30/23	9/30/24	9/30/25	9/30/26
Cash	\$ 450	Recorded Music	\$ 3,840	\$ 3,810	\$ 4,544	\$ 5,320	\$ 5,970	\$ 6,640	\$ 7,382	\$ 8,197	\$ 9,167	Fwd. EBITDA	\$ 1,490	\$ 1,733	\$ 2,012	\$ 2,328	\$ 2,707
Debt	3,846	Music Publishing	643	657	761	903	993	1,098	1,214	1,344	1,489	Multiple	18.4x	17.3x	16.4x	15.7x	15.0x
Net Cash	\$ (3,396)	Intersegment Eliminations	(8)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(13)	(14)	Enterprise Value	\$ 27,402	\$ 30,028	\$ 33,065	\$ 36,564	\$ 40,599
		Revenue	\$ 4,475	\$ 4,458	\$ 5,298	\$ 6,215	\$ 6,954	\$ 7,728	\$ 8,585	\$ 9,529	#####						
Share Price	\$ 37	% growth		(0.4%)	18.8%	17.3%	11.9%	11.1%	11.1%	11.0%	11.7%	Net Cash	(2,104)	(856)	574	2,226	4,131
FD Sharecount	518											Equity Value	\$ 25,298	\$ 29,172	\$ 33,639	\$ 38,790	\$ 44,730
Market Capitaliza	ti \$ 19,169	Gross Profit	\$ 2,074	\$ 2,130	\$ 2,559	\$ 3,016	\$ 3,392	\$ 3,789	\$ 4,230	\$ 4,719	\$ 5,297						
		% margin	46.3%	47.8%	48.3%	48.5%	48.8%	49.0%	49.3%	49.5%	49.8%	FD Shares	526	539	553	567	581
Minority Interest	19	% growth		2.7%	20.1%	17.8%	12.5%	11.7%	11.7%	11.6%	12.3%	PT	\$ 48	\$ 54	\$ 61	\$ 68	\$77
Enterprise Value	\$ 22,584											Returns	30.0%	46.2%	64.5%	85.1%	108.2%
		Adj. EBITDA	\$ 664	\$ 790	\$ 1,018	\$ 1,270	\$ 1,490	\$ 1,733	\$ 2,012	\$ 2,328	\$ 2,707	IRR	42.4%	24.4%	19.9%	17.9%	16.7%
		% margin	14.8%	17.7%	19.2%	20.4%	21.4%	22.4%	23.4%	24.4%	25.4%	Discount rate	12.5%				
		% growth		19.0%	28.9%	24.7%	17.4%	16.3%	16.0%	15.7%	16.3%						
												Implied EV/Sales	3.9x	3.9x	3.9x	3.8x	3.8x
		FCF	\$ 296	\$ 378	\$ 545	\$ 1,243	\$ 1,248	\$ 1,430	\$ 1,653	\$ 1,904	\$ 2,229	Implied FCF Yield	4.9%	4.9%	4.9%	4.9%	5.0%
		% margin	6.6%	8.5%	10.3%	20.0%	18.0%	18.5%	19.2%	20.0%	20.9%						
		% growth		27.7%	44.2%	128.0%	0.4%	14.5%	15.6%	15.2%	17.0%						
															E September 3	,	
		<u>Consensus</u>											2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
		Revenue				\$ 5,993	\$ 6,603	\$ 7,286	\$ 7,842			EV/EBITDA (TCM)	17.8x	15.2x	13.0x	11.2x	9.7x
		% growth (YoY)				13.1%	10.2%	10.3%	7.6%			EV/Sales (TCM)	3.6x	3.2x	2.9x	2.6x	2.4x
		% Delta				3.7%	5.3%	6.1%	9.5%								
												EV/EBITDA (Street)	18.8x	16.1x	14.0x	12.8x	
		EBITDA				\$ 1,202	\$ 1,403	\$ 1,617	\$ 1,764			EV/Sales (Street)	3.8x	3.4x	3.1x	2.9x	
		% margin				20.1%	21.2%	22.2%	22.5%								
		% Delta				5.6%	6.2%	7.2%	14.0%								

Publicly Traded Comps

Warner trades at a discount to DSP players with lower margin profiles, worse leverage in the ecosystem, and slower revenue growth.

Comparable Public Compar	ies (in	\$)															
			CY Revenue			TEV/2022			Forward I	Rev CAGR	2022 Margin						
Company	4	/4/2022	High	Сар	TEV	2022	NTM	2	2023	Revs	GP	EBITDA	CY23	CY21-23	GM	EBITDA	Rule of 40
Warner Music Group	\$	36.98	64%	\$ 19,169	\$ 22,584	\$ 6,215		\$	6,954	3.2x	6.7x	17.8 x	12%	15%	49%	20%	32%
Record Labels		<u> </u>	0.70/	+	+ = 0.400	* 40 = 0			44.40-			10 -		2.404			
Universal Music Group	€	23.71	85%	\$ 47,431	\$ 50,189	\$ 10,50		~~~~~~	11,437	4.4x		1707A	9%	24%		22%	31%
Sony Group	\$	10.35	19%	1,719	1,322	61			792	1.7x	2.8x	(41.3x)	30%	76%	59%	(4%)	26%
		Average:	52%	\$ 24,575	\$ 25,756	\$ 5,558	\$ 5,19	7 \$	6,114	3.0x	2.8x	(10.8x)	19%	50%	59%	9%	28%
	_							_									
DSPs																	
Spotify	\$	153.70	50%	\$ 29,612	\$ 25,163	\$ 11,57	\$ 12,06	5 \$	13,483	1.9x	6.8x	33.7x	16%	31%	28%	6%	22%
SiriusXM	\$	6.59	94%	26,017	35,069	8,98	9,07	9	9,363	3.7x	6.5x	20.7x	4%	8%	58%	18%	22%
iHeartMedia	\$	18.92	67%	2,727	8,949	4,103	4,13	3	4,219	2.1x	3.3x	17.2x	3%	20%	64%	12%	15%
Tencent Music	\$	5.00	24%	8,463	35,216	29,69) 30,26	9	31,947	1.1x	3.6x	7.3x	8%	5%	31%	15%	23%
		Average:	59%	\$ 16,705	\$ 26,099	\$ 13,587	\$ 13,88	7 \$	14,753	2.2x	5.0x	19.7x	8%	16%	45%	13%	21%
Content (Digitization)																	
New York Times	\$	46.05	82%	\$ 7,712	\$ 6,713	\$ 2,334	\$ 2,37	1 \$	2,478	2.7x		24.5x	6%	18%		11%	17%
Discovery	\$	25.02	55%	16,757	30,292	12,60	12,66	6	12,833	2.4x	3.7x	11.8x	2%	10%	64%	20%	22%
Netflix	\$	373.47	53%	165,807	177,896	33,424	34,49	6	37,600	4.7x	11.1x	94.6x	12%	23%	43%	5%	17%
		Average:	63%	\$ 63,425	\$ 71,633	\$ 16,122	\$ 16,51	1 \$	17,637	3.3x	7.4x	43.6x	7%	17%	53%	12%	19%

Key Insight: Warner has room to re-rate higher as ensuing earnings revision cycle occurs, supporting faster revenue growth and better margin profile than peers.

Warner Music Group faces tangible risks to its market position, though we believe much is baked into the current share price.

		Description	Mitigants
1	Streaming Customer Concentration	 Spotify and Apple Music make up a joint ~27% of Warner Music Group's revenue. Increasing leverage of DSPs could result in negotiated rates paid to record labels decreasing during future negotiations. DSPs have attempted to work directly with artists to cut out labels 	 ✓ Artist agreements with the DSPs (such as Beyonce) have mostly fallen apart, with artists realizing that signing direct with a streaming platform is worse for their overall economics than a label. ✓ Spotify had to shut down its feature allowing artists to upload music to the platform directly in 2019 due to lack of traction.
2	Increasing Artist Leverage	 ? A&R costs as a percentage of revenue has ticked up over the last few years (~29% in 2015 to ~33% in 2020), especially as important artists negotiate better rates for themselves. ? WMG skews more towards newer music content, and streaming has shifted more towards catalog at the expense of WMG. 	 ✓ Record labels will see increasing operating margins due to declining costs of distributions and packaging under a streaming-led regime. ✓ Streaming growth should drive operating leverage on the gross margin side, which should offset rising A&R costs. ✓ Mix shift towards international for WMG should support higher gross margins given lower negotiating power of artists.
3	Overindexed to "Trendy" Music Genres	? WMG overindexes to genres like to hip-hop and urban music, which exposes it to risks from streaming platforms who often curate specific playlists (e.g. Rap Caviar) that increase their negotiating leverage.	✓ Overindexing to new music has resulted in acceleration of growth rates relative to peerset as hip-hop and urban music have taken share of music streams

Q&A